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CONDUCTING CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 
RIGHTS STANDARDS
The Contributions of Graphical Knowledge Modeling
Normand Landry, Anne-Marie Pilote, and Anne-Marie Brunelle 
ABSTRACT
Using the computerized application of Modeling using Object Types (MOT) the-
ory, this article examines the normative dimension of official interpretations of 
a corpus of core “communication rights” (the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in cultural life, and the 
right to education) enshrined and protected by the International Covenants on 
Human Rights. This article proposes a methodological contribution whereby the 
computerized application of knowledge modeling theory promotes the analysis 
and popularization of international human rights standards. Research findings 
draw attention to significant conceptual deficiencies included as part of interna-
tional human rights standards. These deficiencies undermine the applicability of 
these standards and their relative usefulness in the context of complex sociopoliti-
cal issues relating to communication. In addition, this article underscores the need 
for communication rights studies to further integrate contributions from the field 
of international human rights law research. It demonstrates that interdisciplinary 
dialogue can open up new research agendas for communication rights scholars and 
contribute to a renewed critical analysis of international human rights standards.
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This article presents the methods and results of a computer modeling 
 process that has been applied over a set of international legal interpreta-
tions of human rights known as “General Comments.” It falls within the 
field of communication rights studies and seeks to contribute to it in three 
distinct ways.
First, it presents an innovative process of human rights analysis based on 
the creation and validation of digital concept maps. These maps highlight 
the conceptual architecture of human rights, their contents and limita-
tions, and the obligations that they impose on States. Thus, they translate 
complex legal norms and principles into an accessible and understandable 
visual language that can be appropriated by academics, lawyers, policy 
makers, and civil society groups. This article makes a methodological con-
tribution whereby the computerized application of knowledge modeling 
theory promotes the analysis and popularization of international human 
rights standards.
Second, computer modeling of legal interpretations captures the politi-
cal interests and power relations embedded in the very structure of official 
legal interpretations of human rights. It also identifies textual ambigu-
ities, logical errors, omissions, and inaccuracies in the “construction” of 
these rights. Consequently, computer modeling problematizes concepts 
and norms mobilized in the field of communication rights studies, while 
simultaneously contributing to the field of international human rights law 
research.
Third, this article demonstrates the need for a more sustained dialogue 
between communication rights studies and the field of international 
human rights law research. The literature that draws on the concept of 
“communication rights” is very sparing when it comes to legal analyses 
of human rights.1 This concept remains primarily confined to disciplines 
within the social sciences,2 and research using this concept largely fails to 
draw on writings of a legal nature in addressing the rights that it covers. 
This article will show that the integration of legal analyses into the field of 
communication rights studies can open up a new research agenda oriented 
around the critical analysis of international human rights standards. It will 
argue that this integration fosters a reconceptualization of human rights as 
1. Hamelink.
2. Padovani and Calabrese; Landry, Droits et Enjeux de la Communication; Raboy and Shtern.
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“communication rights,” moving from discursive and analytical tools to 
objects of political struggle.
Structure of the Article
The article is divided into three main sections. The first section begins with 
a general introduction to communication rights studies, then presents the 
characteristics of the General Comments that were analyzed in the frame-
work of our study, and finally describes the modeling method and process 
that we followed.
The second section presents the main results of our modeling process. 
It highlights the constitutive elements of rights, the obligations that States 
have toward them, legitimate and illegitimate limitations to the exercise of 
these rights, the relationship that they maintain with other international 
human rights standards, and the lexical field within which they fall. The 
section concludes with a critical analysis of the General Comments with a 
special focus on the policy interests embedded in them.
The third section presents the ways in which critical analyses in inter-
national human rights law can contribute to communication rights stud-
ies. To this end, it highlights issues of a political nature in tandem with 
the conceptual clarity that international legal standards bring to bear on 
communication rights. It also stresses the need to better identify and to 
deconstruct the political rationales and interests embedded in interna-
tional human rights norms.
We finally conclude by highlighting the methodological renewal 
enabled by the modeling of legal texts and discuss our contributions to 
communication rights studies. While the literature continues to treat the 
concept of communication rights primarily as a discursive and analytical 
tool mobilized for the purposes of critical analysis and articulating social 
and political demands centered around the democratization of communi-
cation,3 we demonstrate that legal analysis of human rights raised by the 
concept of “communication rights” favors a reconceptualization of the lat-
ter as objects of political struggle. This approach opens up research agendas 
that have been mostly unexplored until now by researchers mobilizing the 
concept of “communication rights.”
3. Raboy; McLeod.
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A Brief Introduction to Communication Rights
A well-established literature positions communication in close connection 
with a corpus of universal human rights, thereby attesting to the role that 
it occupies in the democratization of societies, social integration, and the 
achievement of individual potential.4 From the middle of the 20th century, 
international efforts sought to present communication as a fundamental 
right that needed to be integrated into the main multilateral human rights 
treaties.5 However, the proposed addition of a “right to communicate” 
encountered a stumbling block in the global geopolitical context and was 
abandoned.6
Since the early 2000s, a community of researchers, practitioners, civil 
servants, and human rights activists has been mobilizing the concept of 
“communication rights” in order to evoke and bring together a corpus of 
human rights that is considered to play a key role in the area of human 
communication.7 As such, the idea of communication came as a concep-
tual and strategic redirection following the failure of discussions around 
the establishment of a new human right focussed on communication. As 
Landry argues:
While the concept of the “right to communicate” calls for a new 
human right to be entrenched in international law, the concept of 
“communication rights” calls for the full respect, adequate imple-
mentation, and protection of a set of human rights that have now 
been recognized and that have substantial impacts in the area of 
communication.8
These rights are currently raised politically in order to support and 
legitimize public arguments associated with the democratization of soci-
eties.9 In this regard, they fall under the discourse and argumentation 
repertoire of individuals and groups mobilized on issues of censorship, 
4. Dakroury; Hamelink and Hoffmann.
5. Landry, “Médias, Technologies et Droits Humains”; Dakroury, Mahmoud, and 
Kamalipour; Fisher, “The Right to Communicate”; Harms and Richstad; Posorski; Hamelink; 
Calabrese.
6. Dakroury; Hamelink and Hoffmann; Pickard; Fisher, Le Droit à la Communication.
7. Padovani and Calabrese; Raboy and Shtern; Landry, Droits et Enjeux de la Communication; 
Sen; Mathiesen; Raboy and Landry; Raboy et al.
8. Landry “Médias, Technologies et Droits Humains,” 73.
9. Hackett and Carroll.
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digital divide, access to knowledge and culture, intellectual property, free-
dom of expression, media concentration, hate speech on social media, 
and surveillance.10
In practical terms, the concept of communication rights refers to a 
set of rights and freedoms integrated into international human rights 
law. These rights are imbued with controversies involving sociopolitical 
issues at play in mediatized communication. They are also strongly influ-
enced by technological innovations and transformations taking place in 
the communications sector, and they are the focus of commitments by 
States to respect, protect, and fulfil them.11 The concept of “communica-
tion rights,” therefore, refers to a set of human rights enshrined in inter-
national human rights law, whose protection and effective realization are 
considered necessary by a growing community of scholars so that they 
can be fully and safely integrated into modern communication processes 
and activities.12 The concept of communication rights is thus derived from 
the recognition that freedom of expression is a necessary but incomplete 
condition for all members of society to fully participate in public com-
munication. A set of complementary rights is considered necessary for 
converting freedom of expression into a tangible and concrete individual 
capacity. Each communication right, therefore, touches on one or more 
fundamental aspects of communication: access—to education, technol-
ogy, knowledge, culture, arts, and public forums; participation—in the 
public sphere, in the political, cultural, and artistic life of a community; 
and protection—from hateful speech, invasion of privacy, and attacks 
upon one’s honor and reputation.13
While not exhaustive, the following table presents a set of communi-
cation rights that are protected and guaranteed by the International Bill 
of Human Rights, the foundation that supports the modern interna-
tional legal and administrative structure for human rights, and the three 
legal instruments that comprise it: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the International Human Rights Covenants (the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]), and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
[ICESCR], as well as the Optional Protocols to the Covenants).
10. Tumber and Waisbord; Jørgensen, Human Rights in the Global Information Society; Milan; 
Kidd.
11. Landry, Droits et Enjeux de la Communication.
12. Raboy and Shtern; Dakroury, Eid, and Kamalipour.
13. Landry, Droits et Enjeux de la Communication.
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Communication Rights Related Articles in the International Bill 
of Human Rights
Right to education Arts. 18 and 26, UDHR; Art. 18, ICCPR; 
Art. 13 ICESCR
Right to benefit from scientific progress and 
its applications
Art. 27, UDHR; Art. 15, ICESCR
Right to freedom of opinion and expression Art 19, UDHR; Art. 19, ICCPR
Right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion
Art. 18, UDHR; Art. 18, ICCPR; Art. 13, 
ICESCR
Right to freedoms of assembly and 
association
Art. 20, UDHR; Arts. 21 and 22, ICCPR
Right to self-determination Art. 1, ICCPR; Art. 1, ICESCR
Right to participate in public affairs Art. 21, UDHR; Art. 25, ICCPR
Right to take part in cultural life Art. 27, UDHR; Art. 15, ICESCR
Artistic and scientific freedom Art. 27, UDHR; Art. 15, ICESCR
Right to privacy, honor, and reputation Art. 12, UDHR; Art. 17, ICCPR
Right to protection of moral and material 
interests of authors
Art. 27, UDHR; Art. 15, ICESCR
*Adapted from14
The provisions enshrined in the Charter provide both the conceptual 
tools and the common language necessary for addressing complex media 
issues, while providing normative standards for elaborating and evaluat-
ing public policies. Although there is a substantial body of literature on 
communication rights, there is still no definitive list of “communication 
rights.” Moreover, a consensual interpretative framework on the  normative 
substance of these rights still has to be established among scholars who use 
this concept.15 Few specialists have carried out a detailed and systematic 
analysis of the conceptual and legal substance of communication rights16 
or have comprehensively addressed the public policy issues surrounding 
their implementation at the national level.17 The concept of “communi-
cation rights” consequently refers to a set of rights whose boundaries are 
imprecise and whose substance is still unclear. This is both productive and 
limiting from a scientific and political perspective. Such malleability allows 
14. Landry, “Médias, Technologies et Droits Humains,” 74 (also see Hamelink; CRIS; 
Cammaerts and Carpentier; Raboy and Shtern).
15. Padovani and Calabrese.
16. Hamelink.
17. Raboy and Shtern.
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for this  concept to be transposed into a wide variety of national and 
international contexts. As we will see below, this makes the concept of 
“ communication rights” a powerful discursive and analytical tool for dealing 
with sociopolitical issues of communication and communication policies.
Conceptual and Lexical Development: Speaking  
the Language of Power
Samuel Moyn,18 a historian specializing in the development of human 
rights, considers that human rights began to emerge in the 1970s as an 
international common vocabulary for social justice struggles. Following 
this period, “a variety of groups around the world, and all governments, 
learned to speak [its] language.”19 This language is legal in nature; it confers 
rights, responsibilities, and obligations, and it seeks to define universal 
standards for the regulation of State behaviors toward the people living 
under their jurisdiction.20 In this regard, the concept of “human rights” 
evokes, for Wheatley, “a code that outlined a notion of good, human rights 
respecting, government, reflecting the importance of equal status, physi-
cal and psychological integrity, personhood, participation, and minimum 
welfare rights.”21
The literature attests to an appropriation by an international commu-
nity of researchers of this “code,” of this “language” specific to human 
rights, in order to generate three specific types of contributions. First, 
language, vocabulary, and standards specific to human rights are used in 
order to translate complex sociopolitical issues into discourses that are 
viewed as acceptable and understood by political and legal institutions.22 
Sociopolitical issues associated with media, communication, and culture 
are presented through the lens of fundamental human rights. These issues 
include digital divides; communication-related discrimination on the 
basis of gender, race, culture, language, and social class; the repression and 
censorship of expression, surveillance, and the protection of intellectual 





22. Tumber and Waisbord; Greer.
23. Landry, Droits et Enjeux de la Communication; O’Neill; Hackett; Goggin.
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international public policies relating to communication. Second, interna-
tional human rights norms and standards now constitute analytical tools 
used in critical communication policy research.24 Third and finally, the set 
of conceptual instruments associated with human rights is mobilized in 
order to legitimize and support calls for political, institutional, and legal 
change in the area of communication.25 Research associating a corpus of 
human rights with communication issues or policy is, therefore, often nor-
mative and seeks to contribute to social, policy, or legal change.
Modeling Communication Rights
Those who devote themselves to analyzing communication rights need to 
consider five factors: the nature of the claims connected with these rights 
(what is being claimed or required); the identification of the actors that are 
the objects of claims (first and foremost, the State, but also private actors); 
the conceptualization of the object of the claim (e.g., what is meant by 
“freedom of conscience,” by “privacy,” by “freedom of expression”); the 
identification of the holders of a right and its primary beneficiaries; and 
finally, the tensions and conciliations between these rights.26 Recurring 
debates can be observed on each of these factors, which are the subject of 
political and legal disputes within international human rights institutions. 
Thus, it appears that the concept of “communication rights” shared among 
a community of social sciences scholars can mask strong disagreements on 
the nature, limits and obligations associated with the human rights cov-
ered. Accordingly, to understand the political implications of communica-
tion rights, it is necessary to examine their conceptual and legal dimensions 
in depth. This is achieved, among other things, through deconstructing 
the official and legitimate27 interpretations of the communication rights 
enshrined in the UDHR and the Covenants.
24. Lucchi; Felczak, Smith, and Glass; Moyo.
25. Cammaerts and Carpentier; Padovani and Calabrese; Thomas.
26. Freeman.
27. Abline; Donnelly and Whelan; Evans.
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General Comments and International Standard-Setting in Human Rights
Adopted in 1966 by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and 
implemented 10 years later, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, along with their 
Optional Protocols, are the first multilateral human rights treaties that 
have mandatory legal force. The two Covenants are intended to clarify the 
standards set out in the UDHR and to establish monitoring mechanisms 
to ensure their implementation. They are the two most important interna-
tional human right treaties.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (Committee on Civil 
and Political Rights [CCPR]) and the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Right [CESCR]) are, respectively, empowered to broaden 
and monitor the applicability of the rights protected by the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR.28 These two Committees have four main tasks:
1. They review the States’ reports on the measures adopted to give effect to 
the rights enshrined in the Covenants
2. They investigate inter-State complaints concerning Covenant violations
3. They receive and investigate individual complaints filed under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, and under the Optional Protocols 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
4. They draft and adopt General Comments on the articles of the 
Covenants.
According to Moeckli, the drafting and adoption of the General 
Comments “constitute the first and main means for the committees to 
define the normative content of the Covenants.”29 Taking the form of 
an authorized and authentic interpretation of the rights protected by 
the Covenants, the General Comments expand upon the intent of these 
rights (content, extensions, and limits), and define the specific obliga-
tions of States, which have primary responsibility for their implementa-
tion.30 Considered as “a living instrument that remains as relevant to the 
28. The CCPR was established in 1976, while the CESCR was created in 1985. The decade 
that separates the establishment of the two committees is explained by the fact that the ICESCR 
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contemporary challenges of today as it was when it was adopted,”31 they are 
periodically rewritten and further updated in light of current issues.32 The 
General Comments set out guidelines, or normative guides, on which the 
States rely in order to comply with their obligations regarding the rights 
included in the Covenants.33
Although, the CCPR and the CESCR have published nearly 60 General 
Comments34 since 1981, the status and functions of these documents are 
still not well understood. In fact, there has been relatively little scholarly 
focus on the importance that should be given to these publications. From 
what little has been written on the status of General Comments, it would 
seem that it falls short of positive law.35 General Comments nonetheless 
play a substantive legal role in the elaboration of standards and possible 
future norm within the complex matrix of international law.36 According 
to Blake, it is clear that their legal status has grown over the years beyond 
a mere technical recommendation into an authoritative source of inter-
pretation.37 They are often viewed as “quasijudicial” and as carrying “enor-
mous political and moral weight.”38 In practice, the General Comments 
have taken the form of a powerful and indispensable juridical tool that 
assists in reinforcing standards, as well as in pushing the boundaries of 
31. Security Council, SC/12241.
32. By way of example, in July 2011, the CCPR adopted a new version of the General 
Comment on the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19 of the ICCPR). In 
particular, the first version (1983) did not take into account the “current reality of a globalized 
communications environment dominated by Internet-based technologies” (CCPR/C/2011/2) 
and did not address any of the restrictions authorized in accordance with paragraph 3, Article 
19 of the ICCPR, namely, restrictions expressly set by law and necessary for the “respect of the 
rights and reputations of others” and “the protection of national security or of public order, or of 
public health or morals.” These restrictions were precisely the subject of the main controversies 
regarding the scope of the right. See Mechlem.
33. It should be noted here that our work does not assess the extent to which states are ful-
filling their international obligations under the International Covenants on Human Rights. The 
process of transposing international law into national law is complex and dynamic. It requires 
both legal analysis and analysis of the legislative work carried out by public authorities. This is 
beyond the scope of our study. Our work is limited to a critical analysis of texts that establish and 
clarify international human rights standards. A second step would be to look at the processes by 
which states transpose these standards into national law, or fail to do so.
34. 59 to be exact; 25 for CESCR and 34 for CCPR.
35. Gerber, Kyriakakis, and O’Byrne.
36. Keller and Grover.
37. Blake.
38. Otto; Keller and Grover.
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international human rights law.39 They are now cited in arguments and 
judgments at the national level. Internationally, they have been relied on 
to establish propositions of law by the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as by UN 
treaty bodies and international criminal tribunals.40
By building a body of case law and clarifying human rights standards, 
General Comments encourage greater implementation of the Covenants 
by States Parties. They are, therefore, normative beacons that states can 
mobilize to translate abstract international legal norms into national poli-
cies, laws, and regulations.
Deconstructing the General Comments through a Modeling Process
The following sections provide a critical analysis of the standards laid 
down by the ICCPR and the ICESCR on a corpus of human rights 
closely associated with communication. For this purpose, we will present 
a method to graphically deconstruct the substantive nature conferred on 
each of the rights discussed, thus illustrating its constitutive dimensions, 
general architecture and limits, the obligations that the right imposes on 
the actors involved, and its links with other rights. This process, which is 
achieved through the computerized application of Modeling using Object 
Types (MOT) theory, makes it possible to identify the relationships of 
political power that permeate these interpretations, paying attention to 
the language used in the General Comments, and the processes used to 
draft and adopt these documents. There are inevitably power issues that 
are reflected in the General Comments. Indeed, their writing process is 
conducted through negotiations. They are adopted by consensus and rep-
resent common grounds over human rights standards.41 The analysis pro-
duced in this manner aims to support a critical assessment of human rights 
standard-setting.
The corpus analyzed in the context of this project consists of eight 
General Comments drafted over more than 30 years by the monitoring 
committees for the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
39. Alston.
40. Keller and Grover.
41. Flaherty, “Freedom of Expression.”
This content downloaded from 
             207.162.28.12 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 19:26:46 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
340        JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY
The Comments studied provide an interpretation for the articles listed 
below:
• Article 13: Right to Education (ICESCR); General Comment No. 13 
(1999)
• Article 15-1 (a): Right to Take Part in Cultural Life (ICESCR); General 
Comment No. 21 (2009)
• Article 15-1 (c): The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of 
the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary 
or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author (ICESCR); 
General Comment No. 17 (2005)
• Article 17: The right to respect for private life (ICCPR); General 
Comment No. 16 (1988)
• Article 18: Right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
(ICCPR); General Comment No. 22 (1993)
• Article 19: Freedom of opinion and expression (ICCPR); General 
Comment No. 34 (2011)
• Article 20: Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, 
racial, or religious hatred (ICCPR); General Comment No. 11 (1983)
• Article 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs (ICCPR); General 
Comment No. 25 (1996)
This corpus was established for three main reasons. First, these General 
Comments have been drafted over a long period of time—28 years—which 
makes it possible to appreciate the ways in which they have evolved in form 
and content. Second, these documents were drafted by either the CCPR 
or the CESCR, allowing for evaluation and comparison of their respective 
work. Third, they address issues of access, participation, and protection 
that are central in communication rights scholarship. As a result, General 
Comments have been selected according to the following criteria: the 
search for a balance between the categories of communication rights; the 
integration of General Comments having been written at different periods 
as a way to assess the evolution of the texts over time; the working capacity 
of the team. Subsequent work will make it possible to broaden the corpus 
as well as the analyses carried out on it.42
42. The corpus mobilizes the most recent General Comments for each studied right. Where 
they have been rewritten, previous General Comments (or early drafts) of these rights have 
not been analyzed. As a result, it assembles and presents the current state of the interpretations 
enshrined in international law.
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Our work of conceptual deconstruction was carried out using MOT 
(Modeling using Object Types) graphical knowledge representation soft-
ware. Through digital concept maps, this software makes it possible to 
divide the content of the General Comments into separate parts (compo-
nents, obligations of States, limitations), thus helping to bring to light the 
interpretation work done by the monitoring committees for the Covenants 
and to display how these rights can be translated into public policies.
MOT—Graphical Representation Software for the Classification  
and Display of Complex Knowledge
Developed at TÉLUQ University’s LICEF Research Centre by multidisci-
plinary teams in cognitive sciences led by Gilbert Paquette,43 MOT soft-
ware arose from the computerized application of a knowledge modeling 
theory that aims to schematically represent complex systems, processes, 
methodologies or, in the specific case at hand, texts. The specificity of 
modeling is to simultaneously constitute a method of learning, analysis, 
and knowledge transfer.44 Modeling work also allows the acquisition of 
new knowledge and skills within the research team itself. It constitutes 
an active learning act, structuring, classifying, and analyzing information, 
allowing the acquisition of knowledge by the modeler, who will then be 
able to transfer his knowledge to external audiences. In addition, modeling 
processes generate concept maps that bring together complex, multilevel, 
and interrelated schemas. The simplicity and flexibility of the graphical 
language used in these maps allow users to easily appropriate them—and 
thus assimilate knowledge—but also to adapt and correct them as they see 
fit. In this respect, modeling offers a method of dialogical and collaborative 
knowledge construction between specialists and users, which distinguishes 
it from the approaches traditionally used in textual analysis. The maps 
created by the modeling process are scalable and adaptable to user needs.45
Conceptual maps present complex models structured in “tiers.” Each 
floor hosts a schematic that presents information from the same level. The 
user is prompted to read the schematic and then identify elements that 
have submodels, which can be freely accessed. The upper floors include 
submodels presented at lower levels, from the most general to the most 
43. Paquette, “La Modélisation par Objets Typés.”
44. Basque and Pudelko.
45. Paquette, Modélisation des Connaissances et des Compétences.
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specific. There is no limit to the number of submodels that can be included 
in a concept map. The user is thus called upon to navigate between the 
levels (or submodels) of concept maps. He can proceed in an ascending 
or descending manner. Different concept maps can also be hyperlinked 
to each other, and elements specific to one or more maps can be directly 
linked.
Modeling processes are based on the handling and appropriation of a 
software-specific alphabet that groups together various types of knowledge 
and relationships between maps. This alphabet makes it possible to con-
struct a variety of models and, based on the choices made, “translate” dis-
parate elements into the same language, thus favoring a systems approach 
that allows for developing concept maps46 that are comparable to one 
another.
Knowledge
Knowledge is represented by geometric figures that identify its type. It can 
be abstract or factual. According to Paquette,47 abstract knowledge should 
be seen as schemas or molds that allow the substance that emerges from 
complex texts to be classified and summarized into coherent sets.
The software designed for MOT distinguishes between three types of 
abstract knowledge: concepts, procedures, and principles.
• (1) Concepts describe the objects, persons, and events of a given area; 
they answer the question what. In the area of international human 
rights law, examples of concepts can be “freedom of expression,” “cul-
tural diversity,” “privacy,” “obligations,” and “components of the right.” 
The symbol used to represent a concept is a rectangle.
• (2) Also illustrated by a rectangle in our graphical models, procedures 
illustrate how something is achieved, that is, operations for acting on 
objects, persons, and events. In the general comments, procedures 
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guarantee the exercise of rights. Such procedures may involve “respect-
ing the freedom indispensable for scientific research,” “eliminating legal 
obstacles,” or “respecting the principle of consent.”
• (3) Principles48 depict the properties of objects, establish causal links 
between objects; they answer the question why. The principles also 
determine the conditions under which to apply a procedure, and answer 
the question when. Often, principles take the following form: “under 
this condition, then this action will apply.” In the field of international 
human rights, principles always include the following, among other 
things: “limitations to the right by a State party are permitted only if a 
state of emergency is declared de jure” or “the right to freedom of expres-
sion is imperative and immediately applicable.” The symbol used to 
represent a principle is a flattened hexagon.
Factual knowledge is the raw material extracted from the texts ana-
lyzed. Two types of factual knowledge (out of three possible types) met the 
requirements of the modeling work: statements and examples.
• (1) Statements consist of groups of words/sentences/paragraphs taken in 
full from the General Comments studied on which the proposed con-
cepts and principles are based. We used statements to ensure that all of 
the content of the General Comments analyzed was included in the 
concept maps. The symbol used to represent a statement is a flattened 
hexagon with a dotted outline.
48. The definition of principles in MOT should not be confused with the definition of legal 
principles (as legal rules of a general nature that serve as a basis for texts, usually of a legislative 
nature, with which citizens must comply).
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• (2) Examples are obtained by specifying the values of each of the attri-
butes of a concept. Thus, in international human rights law, examples 
of the concept of “forms of opinion” are “political,” “scientific,” “his-
toric,” “moral,” and “religious.” The symbol used to represent an exam-
ple is a rectangle with a dotted outline.
Relationships
Once the types of knowledge have been identified, it is necessary to 
establish the type of relationships that connect them. In MOT graphi-
cal language, these relationships are represented by arrows pointing in a 
particular direction, accompanied by a letter designating the relationship. 
Of the seven relationships allowed by MOT, five have proven useful for 
deconstructing the General Comments: composition relationships (C), spe-
cialization relationships (S), precedence relationships (P), application relation-
ships, (A) and regulation relationships (R).
• The composition relationship (C)
This relationship connects an element of knowledge with one of its 
components or constituent parts. Thus, the attributes of an object, such as 
the components of an element of knowledge, can be specified by connect-
ing the object to each of its attributes through a composition relationship: 
“is comprised of.”
Figure 1 illustrates the composition relationship. In this concept map, 
generated by modeling the right to education, we can see that the “constitu-
tive elements of the right” are made up of the “right to secondary education,” 
the “right to higher education,” the “right to primary education”, and so on.
• The specialization relationship (S)
This relationship connects two elements of abstract knowledge of the 
same type, of which one is “sort of” like or a special case of the other one. 
In other words, the second is more general or more abstract than the first.
Figure 2 makes it possible to display how the specialization relationship 
operates. The MOT-generated graphical map of the restriction imposed on 
the Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial, or reli-
gious hatred highlights that “advocacy of the sovereign right to self- defence” 
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and “the right of peoples to self-determination and independence” are sorts 
of “exceptions to the prohibition principle.”
• The precedence relationship (P)
This relationship connects two procedures, two concepts, two state-
ments, or two principles, of which the first one must be completed or 
evaluated before the second one begins.
Figure 3 makes it easier to understand the precedence relationship. In 
the MOT map detailing the concept of acceptability of the right to par-
ticipate in cultural life (Article 15 1 (a) of the ICESCR, General Comment 
No. 21), it is indicated in the statement on the right-hand side that the 
cultural laws and policies adopted by a State should be developed and 
implemented in an acceptable manner. “In this regard,” thus in relation to 
the preceding object, the statement on the left-hand side suggests organiz-







The provisions of article 20, paragraph 1, do not 
prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self 
defence or the right of peoples to self determination 
and independence in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations.
Exceptions to the prohibition 
principle
Advocacy of the 
sovereign right of self 
defence
Advocacy of the right of 







figure 2 Article 20 (ICCPR): Restriction on the Prohibition of propaganda for war and 
inciting national, racial, or religious hatred.
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• The application relationship (A)
This relationship connects a fact, an example, or a statement of abstract 
or factual knowledge to an element of knowledge that synthesizes it. It is, 
therefore, a simplification tool that bridges the gap between a textual state-
ment and its conceptual synthesis. As part of our work of modeling the 
General Comments, it was used to include all of the statements contained 
in the texts studied.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the way that the application rela-
tionship works. The concept map created from the concept of physical 
acceptability of the right to education illustrates that the statement on the 
right-hand side “[ . . . ] or via modern technologies (e.g. access to a dis-
tance learning programme)” applies to the example of “distance learning,” 
which, for its part, applies to the concept of “use of modern technologies.”
• The regulation relationship®
This connection is used from a principle toward a concept, procedure, or 














Education has to be within safe 
physical reach, either by 
attendance at some reasonably 
convenient geographic location




Via modern technology (e.





figure 4 Article 13: (ICESCR): Concept of physical accessibility of the right to education.
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that need to be met. In other cases, the connection of regulation means 
that the principle governs the execution of a procedure from the outside.
Figure 5 illustrates the regulation relationship. We note that “nondis-
crimination” and “Equality” govern the “States parties’ obligations” regard-
ing the right to take part in cultural life (Article 15 1 (a) of the ICESCR, 
General Comment No. 21).
Modeling: Process and Steps
Using MOT graphical language, the internal logic used in interpreting 
a right can be made visible by schematically and systematically structur-
ing the content of each of the General Comments studied. This exercise 
involves a series of choices on the part of the modeling team:
1. Identification of the most important elements (which will be translated 
into the primary concepts)
2. Identification of the secondary elements (which will be presented in 
submodels)
3. Determination of the level of details that need to be included in the 
models in order to illustrate the complexity of the content
4. Identification of the categories (concept, principle, examples, etc.) to 
which each object included in the models relates
5. Identification of the types of relationships connecting the elements of 
the models.
This process of conceptual deconstruction occurs in four steps. The first 
step is the creation of the general architecture of the interpretation of the 
right. We identify the broad categories of the General Comment through 
a comprehensive review of the text structure. To facilitate a comparison 
between the General Comments, a certain degree of consistency in this 
general architecture is sought regarding the constitutive elements of the 
right, limitations, obligations of States, links with other rights, and so on. 
However, such consistency is not “mandatory” or “required.” If a comment 
does not contain any elements that justify including it in the table of one 
of these broad categories, it will not appear. When rights are analyzed and 
compared, such differences can immediately be seen, and can be very use-
ful for rights analysis and comparison.
For example, the general architecture of the right covered in Article 15 
1(a) —the right of everyone to take part in cultural life (see Figure 6) — 
comprises nine (9) broad conceptual categories. Basic principles (called 
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“special topics of broad application” in this graphical model, to follow the 
exact wording of the text of General Comment No. 21) govern the inter-
pretation of this right: nondiscrimination and equal treatment.
Next we include the following categories: “components of the right”; 
“necessary conditions for the full realization of the right”; “limitations 
to the right”; “violations”; “States parties’ obligations”; “links with other 
rights”; “international instruments recognizing the right”; and finally, a 
category of keywords developed for each right studied.
In certain cases, abstract elements (concepts or principles) are grayed 
out, since summarizing (often by a category, a word, or an expression that 
respects the intent, but not the exact wording of the text) was carried out 
by the modeling team to facilitate understanding and regrouping of such 
elements. For instance, the expression “components of the right” does not 
appear in the text of the comment, but this category makes it possible to 
bring together all of the concepts and definitions put forward by the draft-
ers of the General Comment to define this right.
The second step consisted in creating submodels from the broad cate-
gories that emerge from the general architecture of the interpretation of a 











Art. 15, para. 1 (a)
Right of everyone to
take part in cultural




conditions for the 

















figure 6 General architecture of the General Comment on the Right of Everyone to Take 
Part in Cultural Life (Article 15 1 (a) of the ICESCR, General Comment 21).
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itself that proposes titles and subtitles chosen by the drafters of the General 
Comments.
The architecture of the submodel of States Parties’ obligations regarding 
Article 15 1 (a) of the ICESCR (see Figure 5 again) highlights the detailed 
and well-developed arguments in General Comment No. 21. These include 
different categories of obligations (general legal obligations; specific legal 
obligations, core obligations, international obligations, and obligations 
guaranteeing the fulfilment of the right), but also specific obligations con-
nected with individuals and groups; obligations of actors other than States 
parties; obligations regarding the protection of cultural diversity, and the 
implementation of all of these measures within the nations; and finally, 
obligations connected to the ICESCR Committee through proof of fulfil-
ment by States parties of their obligations.
The third step consists in refining the submodels by creating additional 
top-down submodels (levels 2, 3, 4, and so on). These submodels will be 
created until the model is deemed satisfactory for properly illustrating the 
content of the comment studied. By way of example, Figure 7 illustrates 
a level-2 submodel (general legal obligations) of the States parties’ obliga-
tions regarding the right of everyone to participate in cultural life. These 
obligations are described in six areas of action that must be accomplished 
by States parties under the ICESCR: (1) prove that a regressive measure 
is justified; (2) ensure respect for the freedom indispensable to scientific 
research and creative activity; (3) guarantee the exercise of the right with-
out discrimination; (4) recognize cultural practices; (5) refrain from inter-
fering in the enjoyment and development of cultural practices; and (6) 
take deliberate and concrete measures.
The modeling team ensured that the entire content of the particular 
General Comment studied49 was integrated into the “stated” knowledge 
type by creating top-down submodels. In practical terms, every word, sen-
tence, and statement from the text of the General Comment was inte-
grated into the MOT knowledge model generated.
49. With the exception of the footnotes, which were not included in the graphical modeling 
process because they are not designed to define the nature of the rights protected by the com-
mittees and of the obligations to which they give rise. Essentially, the footnotes of the General 
Comments refer to other General Comments or to the work of other United Nations commit-
tees or treaty bodies (e.g., in this regard, it is necessary to refer to the recommendation of a par-
ticular committee; other examples of possible violations of article X can be found in a particular 
paragraph of a particular treaty).
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The fourth and last step is a validation step. While the concept maps 
were generated in a process50 led by two researchers who communicated 
on an ongoing basis51 and revised periodically by the project director, the 
complete versions of the maps were reviewed and discussed as a team for 
the preparation of the final version.
50. This process includes producing reports of the amendments made and documenting the 
approach used.













The Covenant imposes on States parties the 
immediate obligation to guarantee that the right 
set out in article 15, paragraph 1 (a), is 
exercised without discrimination, to recognize 
cultural practices and to refrain from interfering 
in their enjoyment and development.
Guarantee the 
exercise of the 






interfering in their 
enjoyment and 
development
Ensure respect for the 
freedom indispensable 






figure 7 Article 15 1 (a) (ICESCR): General legal obligations of States parties regarding 
the right of everyone to take part in cultural life.
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Once these four steps have been completed, we are able to present the 
general architecture of the interpretation of these rights as defined in the 
General Comments. These include (a) identifying the constitutive dimen-
sions of these rights and the limitations to them (b) describing the related 
concepts and States parties’ obligations in detail (c) presenting the links 
with other rights recognized by the Covenants, and (d) proposing a list 
of keywords to summarize the main concepts used by the drafters of the 
General Comments. Once these elements have been established, the con-
cept maps are the subject of four complementary analyses. First, they are 
subject to a language analysis focused on the study of the terms and verb 
tenses used. Verb analysis aims to indicate, in particular, the presence of 
constraints, obligations, or suggestions with respect to states. Second, the 
main concepts used in the general obligations are critically analyzed to 
determine the meaning given to them, as well as the dimensions, themes, 
and characteristics that are related or omitted. Third, the obligations 
toward States are the subject of a particular deepening in order to reveal 
the categories of obligations, the degree of their precision as well as the pre-
scriptive or suggestive character of the language used. Fourth and finally, 
the general architecture of the concept map is closely examined so to iden-
tify the logical and structural organization of the General Comments, as 
well as the sections and subsections that have been worked on in detail, or 
only superficially addressed, by their drafters.
Key Outcomes of the Modeling of the General Comments
The graphical maps produced through MOT present three major contri-
butions to the conceptualization of communication rights: they make it 
possible to structure knowledge in a schematic representation that facil-
itates understanding of what these rights involve; they make conceptual 
issues explicit; and they highlight the political interests integrated into the 
structure of the General Comments itself.
Schematic Representation
The use of MOT helps to develop a deeper understanding of the interpre-
tation of complex rights by revealing their constitutive dimensions, States 
parties’ obligations, limitations to the rights, and the links between these 
rights and other rights.
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Constitutive Elements of Rights
The constitutive elements bring together the definitions adopted for each 
element in the wording of the Covenant right. How specifically they are 
“broken down” varies according to the content of the General Comments 
studied. However, the Committees have increasingly aimed, over the years, 
to establish clear guidelines on the concepts used.
In certain comments, such as the one concerning Article 18 on the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, the interpretation goes 
into greatest detail in the submodels associated with the main constitutive 
elements (Figure 8). Thus, modeling reveals that while freedom of thought 
and freedom of conscience are defined “as negative liberties,”52 the right to 
freedom of religion or belief is exercised through several related freedoms, 
or rights, that range from the right not to profess any religion or belief to 
the freedom to teach a religion or belief in conformity with the convictions 
of parents or legal guardians.
The graphical modeling of the right to education shows that the CESCR 
identifies two specific subjects (here called “special topics of broad applica-
tion”) that apply to all interpretations of this right: academic freedoms and 
the autonomy of educational institutions and school discipline.
In specifying what it means by academic freedoms (see Figure 9), the 
Committee presents well-developed arguments:
• On the people who should enjoy this freedom in the school system
• On the freedoms themselves (pursuing, developing, and transmitting) 
associated with knowledge and ideas
• On the means for acquiring these freedoms
• On the impossibility of enjoying the right to education without aca-
demic freedoms
Graphical modeling facilitates reading these arguments and makes it 
possible to develop an in-depth understanding of the concerns and choices 
of the CESCR in its general comment devoted to the right to education.
52. See General Comment No. 22 (Art. 18, page 2, paragraph 3): “In accordance with articles 
18 (2) and 17, no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts [. . .].”
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States Parties’ Obligations
In addition to the obligations to protect, respect, and implement the right, 
which constitute the core of the commitment of States in signing a cov-
enant, the Committees use the general comments to extend and define a 
broad scope of obligations with respect to the States.
The complexity of the levels of obligations is illustrated in the tree- 
diagram of obligations specifically identified as core obligations, gen-
eral obligations, specific obligations, and international obligations. 
Occasionally, the Committees add principles governing the obligations 
presented.
Sometimes, but much more rarely, the Committees specify obliga-
tions for actors other than States parties. In the General Comment on 
the right to participate in cultural life (Article 15 1 (a)), the CESCR sets 
out obligations for members of civil society, communities, and cultural 
associations, as well as for organizations. The Committee goes as far as to 





















Members of the academic 
community, individually or 
collectively, are free to pursue, 
develop and transmit 
knowledge and ideas.











Persons entitled to academic 







figure 9 Article 13 (ICESCR): Concept of academic freedoms as a special topic of broad 
application of the right to education.
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of their right to participate in cultural life. Such obligations of protec-
tion with respect to these individuals and groups are then translated into 
specific ones attributed to States. Figure 10 is an example concerning the 
protection of the rights of Indigenous peoples. It guarantees the exercise 
of the right to take part in cultural life takes due account of the values of 
cultural life; recognizes and protects rights related to communal lands, 
territories, and resources; and respects the principle of free, prior, and 
informed consent.
Legitimate and Illegitimate Limitations to the Exercise of a Right
Still with the aim of guiding States parties in applying the Covenants, 
the Committees use the General Comments to identify legitimate and 
illegitimate limitations to the exercise of rights. Modeling makes it possi-
ble to distinguish two broad approaches53 for identifying these limitations. 
The first group addresses the prerequisites to the imposition of limitations, 
while a second group specifies concrete restrictions, including legitimate 
and illegitimate limitations, demonstrated in the following two examples.
In the Comment on Article 15 1 (a) on the right of everyone to partic-
ipate in cultural life, the CESCR identifies the prerequisites to the impo-
sition of limitations to the exercise of this right (Figure 11): they must 
be proportionate, compatible with the nature of the right, indispensable 
53. Depending on the right, the Committees may present only one approach (e.g., right to 
participate to cultural life (approach 1); freedom of opinion (approach 2)), or it may present both 
approaches at the same time (e.g., freedom of expression).
SSS
Recognize and protect 
rights related to communal 





Respect the principle of 
free, prior and informed 
consent
Guarantee that the exercise 
of the right to take part in 
cultural life takes due account 
of the values of cultural life
figure 10 Article 15 1 (a) (ICESCR): Obligations of protection with respect to Indigenous 
peoples.
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to democracy, and must pursue a legitimate aim. The Committee speci-
fies the means that enable, in conformity with the obligations under the 
Covenant, restricting the exercise of protected rights in an acceptable man-
ner. The Committee also adds that certain circumstances may left limiting 
the exercise of the right of everyone to take part in cultural life. By adopt-
ing limitations, States will, therefore, also have to show that they meet 
these criteria.
In the comment on the freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19), 
the Committee instead identifies actions to be prohibited in the case of 
illegitimate restrictions on the freedom of opinion: making it a criminal 
offense to hold an opinion; engaging in attacks on individuals; attempting 
to use coercion; proclaiming a state of emergency; and impairing the rights 
that a person holds under the Covenant because of their opinions.
Relationships with Other Covenant Rights
The use of MOT also makes it possible to quickly identify and display the 
links between the various rights, and to effectively summarize the rhetoric 
put forward by the Committees to left these interrelationships.
It should be noted that the monitoring committees for the Covenants 
did not create a section entitled “links with other rights” in their General 
Comments, as they did for sections such as the “obligations” or “restric-
tions.”54 The arguments used to link the interrelationships of the article 
defined in a General Comment with other rights are thus often scattered 
in different sections of the comment.
The number of links that a right has with other rights—proclaimed in 
both Covenants—varies from one General Comment to another. General 
Comment No. 16 (1988) on Article 17 on the right to privacy has no links 
with other rights promoted by the Covenants.
In contrast, in General Comment No. 21 (2009) on the Right to Take 
Part in Cultural Life (Figure 12), the CESCR identifies five articles of 
the ICCPR (Articles 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22) and nine links with articles 
(Figure 13) of the ICESCR (1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15).
54. Even when the text of the General Comments does not include sections, the drafters do 
not refer specifically to “links with other rights.” However, they do explicitly name the “obliga-
tions,” “restrictions,” and other broad categories.
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Keywords
For each comment studied, we created a constellation of keywords associ-
ated with the right studied. The main objective in doing so was to establish 
an initial overview of the lexical field used in connection with the inter-
pretation of this right. Thus, an analysis of the semantic content of the 
comment devoted to Article 15 1 (a)—on the right to take part in cultural 
life (Figure 14)—makes it possible to create a tree-diagram that reviews the 
main themes covered in greater detail in the text.
Critical analysis of the General Comments
A small community of researchers produces critical analyses of the General 
Comments.55 These international law specialists are still largely  discon-























Art. 15, para. 1 (a)
Keywords
Cultural institutions / 

































figure 14 Article 15 1 (a) (ICESCR): Keywords of the right of everyone to take part in 
cultural life.
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nected from communication rights researchers. Their work, in particu-
lar, emphasizes that the process of elaborating the General Comments is 
political in nature.56 Adopted by consensus, the General Comments are 
intended to be the result of intricate negotiations between the members of 
the Committees (both of which are composed of 18 independent experts) 
and the actors (States parties, academics, NGOs), with the possibility of 
providing written feedback on the first version of a comment. While con-
sideration is given to all of the opinions issued, the Committees would 
give precedence to the States parties, which favor using nonmandatory 
and ill-defined terminology in the process of drafting or redrafting official 
texts.5757 The constant use of verbs such as “suggest, invite, recommend” 
rather than “require or mandate,” the use of the conditional (the States 
“should”) rather than the present indicative, and the conceptual weakness 
or lack of a definition around the key concepts58 related to rights enshrined 
in the Covenants are convincing examples of this. In Moeckli’s view, the 
General Comments were clearly abandoned “to the chaos of self-serving 
interpretations by each indifferent or complacent State.”59 They, no doubt, 
include changes compared to the original nature of the Covenant articles, 
but these must never be perceived as major upheavals, lest the States are 
deterred.60 The General Comments must instead be analyzed further as 
invitations to observe a particular behavior, rather than as actual edicts. 
The political interests integrated into these official interpretations of the 
Covenants thus call for deconstructing their content to reveal the ambigu-
ous discourses that they contain and to highlight the scope and limitations 
of these normative guidelines in the conceptualization of human rights, 
and in the specific case of interest to us, communication rights.
The graphical modeling of the General Comments through MOT 
reveals a set of conceptual instruments that is sometimes richly defined, 
and other times not well described, by the committees, thus pointing out 
weaknesses in the conceptual framework due to polysemic concepts that 
have not been defined and are, therefore, difficult to make operational.
56. Keller and Grover.
57. Moeckli, 35.
58. By way of example, in its General Comment 16 (Right to Privacy), the CCPR indicates 
that “every person is required to be protected against arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his privacy,” but does not clarify in what way this constitutes an interference, and nor does it 
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The definitions of culture and cultural diversity in General Comment 
No. 21 (Article 15 1 (a) of the ICESCR—the Right to take part in cultural 
life) are eloquent examples of this. Both are components inherent to cul-
tural life, with culture being interpreted in detail by the CESCR, while 
cultural diversity is not defined.
In the following concept maps, culture is interpreted both as the “cre-
ation and product of a society,” the “reflection of values and humanity,” a 
“process that is historical, dynamic and evolving,” and as “cultural goods.” 
The CESCR even includes other definitions of culture in its Comment 
that come from different declarations or treaties in order to promote the 
many elements inherent to the concept of culture. Conversely, cultural 
diversity is not defined as such. The Committee puts greater emphasis on 
what the defense of cultural diversity represents, namely, an “ethical imper-
ative, inseparable from respect for human dignity,” which involves the 
“respect of human rights,” the “respect of fundamental freedoms,” and the 
“fulfilment of cultural rights.”
The modeling work carried out helped to reveal other ambiguities. In 
the case of General Comment No. 16, Article 17 (ICCPR) on the right to 
privacy, our work of graphical conceptualization helped to identify that 
the concept of privacy itself is not defined. Moreover, we also noted that 
the CCPR considers that “the protection of privacy is necessarily relative,” 
as indicated in the principle governing the concept of privacy, without fur-
ther explaining how far this protection extends and in what cases it must 
be absolute.
The case of Comment No. 21 (2009) on the right to take part in cultural 
life illustrates eloquently the work of conceptualization carried out, at var-
ious levels of complexity, by the drafters of the General Comments. The 
Committee starts by separating each of the terms in the wording of Article 
15 1 (a) of the ICESCR: everyone, the right to participate, cultural life 
(Figure 15). In addition, it specifically mentions the decision of whether or 
not to exercise this right. Note that this possibility of choosing whether or 
not to exercise the right constitutes an exception with regard to the other 
rights studied in the context of this modeling work.
Thus, for “Everyone,” the Committee notes that this term refers both 
to individuals and groups. The right to participate (or to take part) is more 
complex and is divided into three interdependent components (Figure 16): 
participation, access, and contribution to cultural life.
The modeling of these three components reveals a conceptual fea-
ture proposed by the drafters of the General Comment: participation is 
defined as the exercise of rights, including the right to choose his or her 
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own identity; the right to take part in the political life of society; the right 
to engage in one’s own cultural practices, and the right to express oneself 
in the language of one’s choice.
However, access (Figure 17) and contribution to cultural life are defined 
in terms of the exercise of identified and defined rights, including the 
right to know and understand his or her own culture and that of others, 
and the right to learn about forms of expression and dissemination. The 
Committee goes even further by identifying ways to support the exercise 
of these rights through education, information, means of communication, 
and the use of cultural assets.
The Committee affirms that other rights are connected to the right to 
participate in cultural life—whether they directly precede or arise from it.
Thus, “participation” is defined in terms of freedoms and “access” is 
defined in terms of rights. As indicated by Favoreu61 (2015), the concepts of 











Right to participate 
or take part
Participation in




The terms “to participate” 
and “to take part” have 
the same meaning and 
are used
interchangeably in other 
international and regional 
instruments.
There are, among others, three 
interrelated main components of the 
right to participate or take part in 
cultural life
figure 16 Article 15 1 (a) (ICESCR): Components of the right to participate (or take 
part) in the right of everyone to participate in cultural life.
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or disassociated concepts: associated concepts when States are faced with 
negative obligations that require them to refrain from acting, and disasso-
ciated concepts when there is a positive obligation for States to carry out 
a service (in which case, “rights” will be used). This is why the CESCR 
speaks of rights regarding “access” to cultural life, as this access entails pos-
itive obligations for States, and freedoms—although it could also speak of 
rights—regarding “participation” in cultural life, which involves negative 
obligations.
In Comment No. 34 (2011) on the freedom of opinion and expression, 
the Committee proposes to the States—as the verbs used in the text are 
in the conditional—different actions to be taken for establishing a legal 
framework on defamation that is compatible with the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression (Figure 18); for example, this framework will 
recognize public interest as a defense, will try a person charged with defa-
mation as expeditiously as possible, or will place reasonable limits on the 
requirement to reimburse legal costs.













To follow a way of life 
associated with the use of 
cultural goods and resources 
such as land, water,13 
biodiversity, language or 
specific institutions.
To benefit from the 
cultural heritage and 






Covers in particular the right of 
everyone — alone, in association 
with others or as a community — 
to know and understand his or her 
own culture and that of others 
through education and 
information, and to receive quality 
education and training with due 
regard for cultural identity
Access to
Use of cultural 
goods and 
resources
Everyone has also the right 
to learn about forms of 
expression and 
dissemination through any 
technical medium of 
information or 
communication.
Right to know 
and 
understand his 
or her own 
culture and 
that of others
Right to learn 
about forms of 
expression and 
dissemination
Through any technical 
medium of information 
or communication
Right to 
follow a way 
of life
Right to benefit from 
the cultural heritage 
and the creation of 
other individuals and 
communities
figure 17 Article 15 1 (a) (ICESCR): Concept of access as a component of the right to 
participate in the right of everyone to participate in cultural life.
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Political Interests Integrated into the General Comments
Another contribution of analysis using graphical modeling is to corrobo-
rate what Neuman,62 O’Flaherty,63 and Abline64 raised concerning the non-
binding terminology frequently used by the Committees in the sections of 
the General Comments pertaining to States parties’ obligations.65 Thus, in 
the General Comments that were deconstructed using MOT, while the 
language used for the obligations is sometimes coercive, it is not binding 
most of the time.
The terminology used (“suggest,” “invite,” “recommend”) as well as 
the use of the conditional tense shows that the General Comments must 
be analyzed as invitations to conform to a particular behavior.66 The 
Committees have no other choice than to rely on the good faith of the 
States parties with respect to the Covenants.67
The earlier example, concerning obligations of the right to take part in 
cultural life (Figure 19) is among the rare cases where the words chosen by 
the CESCR—“must show,” “requires,” and “are required” —are binding:
These binding action verbs represent, however, a small percentage of 
the verbs used by the Committees. In fact, the modeling work reveals the 
frequent use of nonbinding verbs such as “invite, recommend, encour-
age” in the obligations imposed on States parties. The conjugation of verbs 
in the present conditional is also indicative of nonbinding terminology 
favored by the Committees (Figure 20). “The States parties should” is an 
expression that recurs regularly in the General Comments, particularly in 
the obligations of the right to participate in public affairs and the right to 
education.
Thus, the obligations of States parties may be understood more as guid-




65. This is due, among other things, to the nature of the General Comments, which  constitute 
guidelines for the States.
66. Despite this observation, certain expressions used, such as “the States parties must show” 
(General Comment 21—Right to Take Part in Cultural Life ICESCR) or “conformity with arti-
cle 17 requires States parties” (General Comment 17—Right to Privacy ICCPR), may give the 
impression that these are binding statements.
67. Besson.
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Take measures to 
redress any de 
facto 
discrimination





Educational data should be 
disaggregated by the 





States parties must closely monitor education - 
including all relevant policies, institutions, 
programmes, spending patterns and other 
practices - so as to identify and take
measures to redress any de facto discrimination.
figure 20 Article 13 (ICESCR): Terminology of obligations related to discrimination: 
the statement on the left-hand side emphasizes that “educational data should be disaggregated 
by the prohibited grounds of discrimination [ . . . ],” whereas the statement on the right-hand 
side indicates that “States parties must closely monitor education so as to identify [ . . . ] any de 
facto discrimination.”
requirements that are imposed on them. As Moeckli,68 Neuman,69 and 
Abline70 have pointed out before us, the terms used indicate that intricate 
negotiations likely took place between States during the process of elabo-
rating the Comments; among other things, the choice of a verb in the con-
ditional would informally authorize a country that ratified the Covenants 
to circumvent the obligation in question.
Besides the increased use of nonbinding terms in the obligations, other 
wordings used allow States to interpret and, in some cases, to depart from 
the guidance or prescribed rules. We offer two examples to illustrate this 
position: the use of the terms “to the extent possible” and the expression 
“in principle,” which may be interpreted also as nuanced, and even inten-
tionally vague, in applying the rules put forward. The concept maps of the 
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The preceding analyses highlight the conceptual architectures, constitu-
tive dimensions, and obligations associated with a corpus of human rights 
closely connected to communication. These analyses concern particular 
interpretations of these rights: they deal with General Comments, which 
are the only authorized interpretations of the ICCPR and the ICESCR,71 
and present their flaws, limitations, and inconsistencies. In this regard, 
this article presents a contribution to the field of research in international 
human rights law72 while advocating for the creation of more robust con-
nections between the communities of researchers in international human 
rights law and those in social sciences. The discussion that follows presents 
a proposed general framework to accomplish this.
Reconceptualizing Communication Rights:  
The Role of Legal Analysis
We have argued earlier that the literature examining communication rights 
proposes an approach to such rights that is essentially conceptual. The 
rights encompassed by this concept are treated using the approach favored 
by Freeman,73 considering them as concepts that allow for articulating 
abstract ideas and giving legitimacy to the claims made against States.74
However, the human rights grouped under the concept of “commu-
nication rights” also constitute standards of a legal nature integrated 
into international human rights law.75 Such standards entail responsibil-
ities, obligations, and requirements for States; they claim to participate 
in processes to regulate the actions taken by States with respect to their 
populations.
Considered as legal standards, communication rights are eminently 




74. By way of example, the concept of “right to privacy” makes it possible to group together 
and articulate the concepts of anonymity, surveillance, intimacy, and personal information (see 
Landry, “Médias, Technologies et Droits Humains ”), associated with the principles of dignity, 
autonomy, and human freedoms. The “right to privacy” is consequently a concept—a repre-
sentation of an abstract idea—on which hinge demands made to public authorities for them 
to undertake specific actions in order to protect its essence, while refraining from infringing its 
boundaries themselves.
75. Hamelink.
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taken by public authorities, in connection with sociopolitical issues in 
communication, and on the basis of moral principles presented interna-
tionally as being universal.76 These standards codify in international law 
expectations with respect to States and establish procedures for evaluating 
and monitoring the actions taken by States in order to comply with these 
expectations.
Such an approach necessarily leads to in-depth examinations of the 
quality of international legal standards in communication rights, as well 
as of the logic and interests that contributed to the elaboration of these 
standards.
Quality of Legal Standards
The quality of legal standards associated with communication rights 
depends, first, on their degree of conceptual clarity. Our research shows 
that the General Comments have varying degrees of conceptual clarity. It 
seems that there is no consistent approach to the definition of key terms. 
The Committees sometimes try to define certain terms very precisely and 
sometimes avoid doing so. This results in highly variable normative stan-
dards of precision, clarity, and applicability. For example, while General 
Comment No. 21 (2009) on the right to participate in cultural life endeav-
ors to present in detail the meaning given to the “right to participate in 
cultural life” —in particular regarding the concepts of “participation” and 
“cultural life” —, General Comment No. 16 on the right to respect for 
private life (1988) does not define the concept of private life itself. The 
object itself that is the focus of the standards established by this General 
Comment remains rather vague and poorly defined. The standards are con-
sequently subject to conflicting interpretations and continue to be of little 
use for resolving complex conflicts. Similarly, while General Comment 
No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression specifies that 
the only two acceptable reasons for restricting freedom of expression are 
the “respect of the rights or reputation of others” and “the protection 
of national security or public order, or public health and morals”, this 
Comment does not clarify what is understood by “protection,” “public 
safety,” “public order,” “public health,” and “morals.” This allows States 
to provide their own definition of the meaning to be given to these key 
concepts, and to determine when they can act in order to “protect” them. 
76. Fellmeth; Moeckli, Shah, and Harris; Wheatley.
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In fact, these grounds have been raised extensively by States in order to 
legitimize unacceptable limitations to freedom of expression.77 In contrast, 
General Comment No. 17 (2005) endeavors to differentiate between the 
ontological foundations, characteristics, and purposes of intellectual prop-
erty rights and human rights, thereby opposing the discourses brought 
by economic interests that seek to extinguish the concept of intellectual 
property rights with the right to protection of moral and material interests 
of authors.78 Here, we see that conceptual clarity has profound political 
and legal consequences.
Second, the quality of the legal standards is subject to their ability to 
cover all facets of the rights to which they relate. Thus, General Comment 
No. 34 (2011) on the freedoms of opinion and expression fails to present 
and raise the complex relationships of tension and complementarity that 
exist between the freedom of expression and privacy as an issue.79 It does 
not, therefore, allow for agreement on the role played by the protection of 
the right to privacy in preserving freedom of expression, or to determine 
when, and based on which criteria, a claim to the right to exercise free-
dom of expression can legitimately interfere with the right to privacy. The 
quality of the legal standards also depends on their evolving nature; they 
must establish guidelines, tools that make it possible to guide actors faced 
with new or unusual situations. The General Comments must, therefore, 
constitute up-to-date interpretations.
It should be noted that the Committees have the opportunity to rewrite 
the General Comments so as to “update their scope in the light of today’s 
conditions.”80 These updates are also an opportunity to considerably clarify 
the contents of the General Comments in light of case law.81 The normative 
densification resulting from this rewriting work is particularly apparent in 
General Comment No. 34 (2011) on the right to freedom of expression 
and opinion, which is a major update of General Comment No. 10 (1983). 
The new text fits into a radically transformed legal, legislative, and techno-
logical context and raises issues of freedom of expression that did not exist 
before the emergence of digital technologies.
Some General Comments nevertheless remain obsolete. For example, 
General Comment No. 16 on the right to privacy has not been rewritten 
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in nearly 32 years, despite calls from experts for an urgent rewrite.82 The 
emergence and seriousness of widespread surveillance practices developed 
by states, commercial, and private actors over the last three decades con-
trasts with the lack of consistent work on privacy rights carried out within 
the Human Rights Committee. As a legal concept and norm, the right to 
privacy urgently needs to be reconceptualized at the international level. 
Our modeling work shows, in particular, the absence of any link between 
this right and digital technologies.
The research described in this article highlights significant conceptual 
deficiencies included as part of international human rights standards. 
These deficiencies undermine the applicability of these standards and their 
relative usefulness in the context of complex sociopolitical issues relating 
to communication.
Logic and Political Interests
International human rights standards are established on the basis of politi-
cal negotiations whereby political interests are expressed in tensions, if not 
outright contradictions.
These interests are expressed at four distinct steps in the establishment 
of these standards. They are integrated into the processes of drafting inter-
national human rights texts; they are engaged in the interpretation pro-
cesses of these standards, in particular when conflicts and controversies 
arise in connection with their violation; they influence the determination 
of the mechanisms for applying these standards and the monitoring of 
stakeholders’ actions; and they provide structure for the enforcement and 
sanction mechanisms applied to ensure conformity with the established 
standards.83 At each of these steps, the States parties involved in the pro-
cesses of elaborating and implementing international human rights stan-
dards seek to influence these processes in a way that is favorable to them.
These interests are focused essentially on two issues: the degree to which 
States can be held accountable for their action or inaction, and are required 
to tolerate interferences in their internal affairs; and the deliberate instru-
mentalization of human rights bodies, mechanisms, and actors in order to 
82. O’Flaherty.
83. Glendon; Morsink; Wheatley.
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serve specific political objectives that frequently have little to do with the 
protection, respect, and fulfilment of human rights.84
In the specific context of the drafting and adoption of the General 
Comments, our research identified a settling of political interests in the 
final texts around two discourse strategies. We note, first, the deliberate 
use of nonbinding language with respect to specific obligations imposed 
on States regarding the protection, respect, and implementation of human 
rights. Accordingly, the concept of “obligations” is reframed from the per-
spective of “recommendations,” thereby weakening the accountability of 
the States parties with regard to frequently central provisions of human 
rights standards. Second, the General Comments sometimes avoid defin-
ing politically charged concepts and contain ambiguities regarding the 
obligations that arise from them. Thus, the concepts of “moral interests” 
and “material interests” are never clearly defined in General Comment 
No. 17 (2005), which is nonetheless devoted to their protection. Similarly, 
the concepts of “national security” and “public order,” considered to be 
legitimate grounds for restricting the right to education, are not defined 
in General Comment No. 13. O’Flaherty85 explains that the conceptual 
vagueness contained in the General Comments can reflect a desire to pro-
tect potentially restrictive and limiting interpretation standards, or to serve 
the interests of States that take advantage of their breadth of interpreta-
tion. In both cases, considerations that are essentially political influence 
the drafting processes of the General Comments.
Legal Standards as Objects of Struggle
The concept of “human rights” evokes simultaneously concepts and stan-
dards of a moral and legal nature. Human rights thus constitute “both a 
political philosophy and a set of standards of rules of law.”86
When they are considered as concepts, human rights put forward 
abstract ideas that are closely linked to the principles of freedom, equality, 
and human dignity. These ideas are centered around demands (claims87) 
relating to specific objects, considered indispensable to the realization of 
a life “of dignity, a life worthy of a human being.”88 These ideas take root 
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in varied philosophical, cultural, and political traditions,89 and they have 
relationships of support and tension between them.90 They are the subject 
of continual debates and discussions, and reflect tensions that permeate 
societies and the relationships that they have.91
As legal standards, human rights impose sets of obligations, duties, and 
responsibilities on State, public, and private actors. A highly complex set of 
instruments, involving multiple levels and actors, is applied to developing 
these standards and establishing mechanisms for monitoring, surveillance, 
implementation, and sanctions.92
The literature attests to the multiplicity of standard-setting bodies in 
human rights and divergent discourses on each of these elements.93 At each 
level of governance, a broad spectrum of actors are involved in processes 
that are at times cooperative, and other times antagonistic, and that seek 
to clarify the intent and scope of human rights, as well as to define the 
resulting obligations, duties, and mechanisms for implementation and 
monitoring. Marked by dynamics of power and domination, these pro-
cesses are reflected in an ability to impose standards with variable content 
that are often sufficiently polysemic to be interpreted in different ways.94 
In this context, it is appropriate to reflect upon standard-setting bodies 
in human rights—particularly those that benefit an authority deemed to 
be “legitimate,”95— the actors involved, the mechanisms whereby these 
standards are produced, and the precise nature of the standards generated.
In other words, the use of a shared set of conceptual instruments regard-
ing the concept of human rights conceals deeply divergent conceptions 
about the nature of such rights, their scope and limits, the obligations that 
accompany them, their place in the political organization of societies, the 
relationships that they have with other values and institutions—the fam-
ily, tradition, religion, customs—, and conditions under which they can 
be legitimately suspended or limited.96 With regard to these aspects, the 
legal standards applicable to human rights constitute full-fledged objects 
89. Morsink.
90. Landry, Droits et Enjeux de la Communication.
91. Lacroix and Pranchière.
92. Jørgensen, “Human Rights and Communication Discourses.”
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of political struggle that mobilize actors from civil society, businesses, and 
private individuals, international institutions, and States.
The role of the General Comments fits into this framework. These 
documents have a legitimacy conferred by international law and institu-
tional support from international organizations for the purpose of inter-
preting and defining, with a certain degree of authority,97 the intent that 
needs to be ascribed to human rights and the resulting obligations for 
States. In other words, the General Comments aim to produce shared and 
detailed conceptions of human rights.98 It is thus not at all surprising that 
they include political considerations and interests: they are intended to be 
imposed as normative guidelines in the field of international human rights 
law and to guide the actions of States in this area.
Conclusion
The notion of “communication rights” refers to legal norms in interna-
tional law that are of particular importance for the democratic develop-
ment of societies. The processes of defining and conceptualizing these 
rights, therefore, deserve to be critically analyzed.
By enabling the development of a fine and in-depth understanding 
of the argumentative logic of the General Comments, our work shows 
how graphical modeling serves as both an innovative method and an 
accessible tool for analyzing international standards, bringing together a 
corpus of human rights that play an essential role in the field of human 
communication.
The graphical representation of the United Nations official interpreta-
tions of communication rights with MOT, therefore, represents a signifi-
cant methodological renewal, as it allows for the elaboration of conceptual 
maps that can highlight a range of elements: the constitutive and norma-
tive dimensions of communication rights; the conceptual architecture of 
these rights; the limits of these rights; the obligations of States and non-
State actors; the relationships that exist between rights; and the lexical field 
associated with each right. These conceptual maps are thus powerful tools 
for critical analysis of international human rights standards.
97. Wheatley.
98. Schmidt; Abline; Cohen-Jonathan.
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These maps also make it possible to appreciate the power embedded in 
the final wording of the General Comments. Supported by literature, our 
work shows that political interests run through the very structure of the 
General Comments. The analyses highlight the use of discursive strategies 
mobilizing imprecise, nondefined concepts, as well as nonbinding obliga-
tions, thus leaving room for interpretative flexibility for States.
Graphical representation emphasizes and makes the textual architec-
tures of documents visually explicit. It presents the relationships between 
elements, the main categories of information, and systematically classifies 
and prioritizes content. As such, the final products of the modeling work 
carried out—concept maps—are powerful communication and popular-
ization tools that can be appropriated by various actors in order to under-
stand complex legal texts. They find an audience not only in academic 
and legal circles, but also in government and specialized agencies. They 
are useful analytical tools for third actors (including human rights groups) 
who monitor countries’ actions in the area of human rights. In addition, 
these maps provide pedagogical support for teaching complex interna-
tional human rights norms. The modeling work reported in this article 
has thus produced research results that fill gaps in the scientific literature, 
while generating tools that can be used for analytical, educational, and 
public communication purposes.
A Renewed Research Agenda
The findings of our work lead to two proposals to renew the field of com-
munication rights studies.
First, the literature that mobilizes the concept of “communication 
rights” still neglects to study the processes, rules, and institutions that gov-
ern legal standard-setting in international human rights. As a result, stud-
ies on communication rights should focus more on the political jousting 
and analysis of power relationships that shape the development of legal 
standards. In this regard, our conclusions lead us to reconceptualize com-
munication rights as objects of struggle that, in themselves, incorporate 
political interests. They are thus subject to a more robust critical decon-
struction by the scientific community.
Second, communication rights studies are turning away from the crit-
ical analysis of international legal standards as they pertain to legal rights 
mobilized in the communication field. In fact, it is still rare for research 
being carried out to examine the ability of these standards to respond 
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adequately to sociopolitical issues in communication. Neuman99 and 
Moeckli100 recently showed that the interpretative work of the Committees 
is increasingly reflected in decisions handed down by national courts, but 
that these decisions are rarely transposed into public policy. In their view, 
a major awareness-raising effort on the justiciability of human rights is 
required to promote the implementation of the Covenants. Our work pre-
figures a research agenda oriented around the adequacy of national pub-
lic policies on communication and their compatibility with international 
human rights standards.
These two avenues of research foreshadow more sustained collabora-
tions between the communities of researchers in international human 
rights law and researchers in social sciences. Such collaborations have the 
potential to considerably enrich the field of communication rights studies.
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